Almost every connection between a website and a browser is protected by TLS, which relies on RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Classical computers cannot realistically break these algorithms, but a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could. Cryptographers have therefore designed quantum-resistant algorithms, and they are already part of everyday web traffic: a significant share of connections from modern browsers now use post-quantum key exchange.
The threat to TLS
During a TLS handshake both sides agree on a shared secret key, usually with X25519 or P-256, and then encrypt everything with it. Shor's algorithm, designed for quantum computers, can in theory solve exactly the maths these methods rely on. Today's quantum machines are far too small, but nobody knows when that will change. The real risk starts now: an attacker can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it years later. This "harvest now, decrypt later" strategy matters for patient records, financial data and anything that must stay secret for a decade.
What ML-KEM is
After a multi-year open competition, the US standards body NIST published its first post-quantum standards in 2024. One of them is ML-KEM, published as FIPS 203 and known during the competition as Kyber. Based on lattice mathematics, it replaces the key exchange step in TLS. The most widely used variant, ML-KEM-768, has much larger keys than classical algorithms, with a public key of over a kilobyte, but computation is fast.
The hybrid approach
New algorithms have not had decades of scrutiny, so TLS uses a hybrid: classical X25519 and ML-KEM-768 run together and their outputs are combined, so an attacker must break both. The TLS group is called X25519MLKEM768. Modern Chrome, Firefox and other major browsers support it by default. It requires TLS 1.3.
Certificates are not changing yet. Signatures that prove a server really is example.uz still use RSA or ECDSA. A post-quantum signature standard, ML-DSA, exists, but bringing it to the public certificate system is harder and still in progress. Signatures are less urgent because they can only be forged during a live connection, not applied to recorded traffic.
Testing your server
You need OpenSSL 3.5 or newer, the release that added ML-KEM:
openssl version
echo | openssl s_client -connect example.uz:443 -servername example.uz \
-groups X25519MLKEM768 2>/dev/null | grep -i "group"
If supported, the negotiated group shows X25519MLKEM768; otherwise the handshake fails because only that group was offered.
Enabling it in Nginx
On your own VPS, Nginx must be linked against OpenSSL 3.5 or newer. Some recent Linux distributions ship it; older ones do not. Then list the groups:
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name example.uz;
ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
ssl_ecdh_curve X25519MLKEM768:X25519:prime256v1;
ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/example.uz/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/example.uz/privkey.pem;
}
The hybrid group comes first, so new browsers pick it while older clients fall back to classical groups. Check with nginx -t, then systemctl reload nginx. OpenSSL 3.5 already enables the hybrid group by default, so sometimes no change is needed.
Possible issues
The larger key makes the ClientHello too big for a single packet. Most networks handle this, but some old firewalls and middleboxes mishandle it and drop the connection; updating their firmware usually fixes it. On shared hosting these settings are managed server-wide by the provider, so a Bukhara travel agency site on sayt.uz hosting needs no action.
The migration will take years. Make sure TLS 1.3 is on, keep your OS and OpenSSL updated, and if you handle long-lived secrets in fields like healthcare or finance, plan the move early.