DNS hijacking does not touch your website files at all. The server is fine, the code is unchanged, the database is intact, yet people typing your domain end up somewhere else. The attacker changes DNS answers, and with them gains your traffic, your mail and even the ability to obtain an SSL certificate. The owner is often the last to notice.
Where DNS can be hijacked
The most common route is taking over the account that manages the domain. With a leaked or phished password, the attacker switches the nameservers or edits A and MX records, affecting the entire internet. A separate DNS hosting account with weak protection leads to the same result. On the user side, an attacker who knows an office router's password can change its DNS server so every device on that network gets forged answers. Malware on a computer can also edit the hosts file or system DNS settings. The last two affect only some users and are harder to spot.
Signs that should alarm you
- The domain's NS list changed without your action.
- Customers report certificate errors or a different-looking site.
- Incoming company mail stops while sending still works.
- You receive a login or change notification you did not trigger.
- Certificate Transparency logs, searchable via
crt.sh, show a certificate you never ordered.
Quick checks from the command line
dig +trace example.uz
dig NS example.uz +short
dig @1.1.1.1 example.uz A +short
dig @8.8.8.8 example.uz A +short
resolvectl status
If public resolvers return the correct IP but office machines reach another address, the problem is local: the router or device DNS settings were changed. If every resolver shows a foreign IP, the zone or domain account was modified, which is more serious.
Example: a school website
A private school near Tashkent woke up to its site showing parents a fake "view grades" login page. The IT staff found nothing changed on the hosting, but dig NS showed the domain delegated to unfamiliar nameservers. The domain account was tied to the personal email of an employee who had left years earlier, and that mailbox had been compromised. The school recovered the account through registrar support, restored the nameservers, moved the account to an official school address and asked parents to change any passwords entered on the fake page.
First response when you spot it
Do not start by editing records from a device you are unsure about. From a clean computer, change the password of the domain account and of the email address attached to it, enable two-step verification and end all other sessions. Then restore the correct nameservers and records, lower the TTL so the fix spreads faster, and tell customers if a fake page may have collected their passwords. Keep notes and screenshots of what you found, because the registrar's support team will need them.
Defences
Secure the domain account
Use a long unique password and two-step verification, attach the account to a permanent organisational mailbox and limit who has access. In the sayt.uz cabinet, review contact details and login settings from time to time.
Monitor NS and key records
#!/bin/sh
EXPECTED="ns1.example.uz. ns2.example.uz."
CURRENT=$(dig NS example.uz +short | sort | tr '\n' ' ' | sed 's/ $//')
if [ "$CURRENT" != "$EXPECTED" ]; then
echo "NS changed: $CURRENT" | mail -s "DNS alert" admin@example.uz
fi
Run it hourly from cron with 0 * * * * /usr/local/bin/ns-watch.sh.
Restrict certificates with CAA
example.uz. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
example.uz. 3600 IN CAA 0 iodef "mailto:admin@example.uz"
CAA will not help once DNS is fully taken over, but it makes obtaining certificates from other authorities harder.
DNSSEC and router hygiene
DNSSEC signs DNS answers and makes forging them on the path difficult; availability depends on the zone and registrar, so check in advance. In the office, change default router passwords, disable remote management and keep firmware updated.