A domain name is one of a company's most valuable digital assets, yet it is often treated as a one-off task: registered, paid for and forgotten. Whoever controls the domain account decides where the website opens, who receives company email and even whose name the domain is held in. Protecting that account matters as much as server security.
How accounts are actually lost
Fake "your domain is expiring" emails
Phishing is the most common method. An urgent message claims the domain will be suspended today or a payment failed, and the button leads to a convincing copy of the provider's login page. Instead of clicking, type the service address yourself and check the domain status inside your account.
Reused passwords
If the same password was used on a forum or online shop whose database leaked, attackers will automatically try it on many other services. An account protected by a reused password should be treated as unprotected.
Forgotten or someone else's mailbox
Password reset links go to the email attached to the account, so access to that mailbox means access to the domain. If it belongs to a former employee, an abandoned inbox or the agency that built your site, control is not really yours.
Too many people, no records
In many organisations nobody can say who still has the password. It was given to a developer, then a marketing agency, then a new IT hire, and never changed. When something goes wrong, there is no way to tell who made a change or to revoke access quickly.
Example: a restaurant chain and a design studio
A Tashkent restaurant chain had a studio build its website, and the studio registered the domain in its own account with its own email. Years later the studio closed and its mail domain lapsed. Renewal reminders went to a dead address, and the owners only noticed when the site went offline. Proving ownership from documents was slow and stressful, and it would never have happened if the domain had been registered to the company from the start.
Core layers of protection
Enable two-step verification first, preferably with an authenticator app rather than SMS, and keep backup codes somewhere safe. Attach the account to a permanent organisational address such as domains@example.uz, protected the same way. If that address is on the same domain, add a backup contact on a different domain, because a hijacked domain also means hijacked mail. Check whose name the domain is registered in; a company domain should belong to the legal entity:
whois example.uz | grep -iE "status|expir|name server|registrant"
Output differs by zone and some fields may be hidden for privacy. What matters is that ownership and contact data in your account are current; the sayt.uz cabinet lets you review and update domain contacts.
Keep access under control
- Maintain a list of people with access to the domain and DNS and review it at least yearly.
- Change the password the day a contractor or employee leaves.
- Share credentials through a password manager, not chat messages.
- Never leave the domain in a contractor's account or name.
- Put renewal dates in a calendar and enable auto-renewal where available.
Forgotten renewals are in practice the most common way domains are lost, and an expired domain registered by someone else can be harder to recover than a stolen account.
If the account has been stolen
Secure the attached mailbox first, otherwise the attacker can reset the password again. Contact support and prepare proof of ownership such as company registration papers and payment receipts, and warn customers to be careful with requests that appear to come from your site or email. After recovery, review nameservers, DNS records, mail forwarding rules, contacts and the access list, since attackers sometimes leave small changes like an extra MX or TXT record.