The better known your site is, the more people want to borrow its name. Fraudsters rarely try to break into the real domain. They register a very similar one, copy the design and spread the link through ads, messengers or email. A visitor who does not look closely at the address bar enters card details or a password on the fake site.
How lookalike domains are built
Typosquatting relies on typing mistakes: exmaple.uz, examplle.uz, exampe.uz. Visual tricks swap characters, such as 1 for l, rn for m or 0 for o. Where internationalised names are allowed, a Latin letter can be replaced by an identical-looking Cyrillic one; such names are stored as punycode starting with xn-- but some software displays them as ordinary letters. A third group uses other zones or extra words: example-uz.com, example-login.uz. Long addresses like example.uz.boshqa-sayt.net are also common, where the real domain is boshqa-sayt.net at the end.
Example: an electronics store and a fake discount
A Tashkent electronics store started getting calls about paid orders that did not exist in its system. A social media ad for "smartphones at half price" copied the store's design but led to a similarly named site in another zone, where customers had entered card details. The store reported the site to its hosting provider and registrar, asked the platform to block the ad, posted a notice about its single official address, and later registered the most commonly confused variants and redirected them to the main site.
Monitoring new lookalikes
Certificate Transparency logs
Fake sites almost always get an SSL certificate, and every certificate from a trusted authority is logged publicly:
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%25example%25&output=json" \
| jq -r '.[].name_value' | sort -u
Your own official subdomains will appear in the results too. Filter them out and review whatever is left, paying special attention to names registered recently. The service can be slow or rate-limited, so a few runs a week are enough.
Generating variants automatically
pip install dnstwist
dnstwist --registered example.uz
dnstwist --registered --format csv example.uz > twist-$(date +%F).csv
Compare monthly results to spot newcomers. For each new name, open the site and check whether it has an MX record, since a lookalike with mail configured is often prepared for fake emails:
dig MX examp1e.uz +short
dig A examp1e.uz +short
Keep a simple log of every suspicious domain you find, with the date and what the site showed. If the same pattern keeps appearing, it often points to the same group, and a documented history makes abuse reports much more convincing.
Defences
You cannot register every variant, but owning the brand in other popular zones, the hyphenated form and the most common typo is sensible; redirect them with a 301 to the main site. sayt.uz lets you manage .uz and international domains in one cabinet, which makes such defensive domains easier to track.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC cannot stop mail from a different domain, but they make spoofing your exact domain harder and DMARC reports show who tries:
_dmarc.example.uz. 3600 IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.uz"
Tell customers clearly which address is official and that you never ask for card details in messengers, and give them an easy way to report fakes. When you find a lookalike, use whois and IP data to identify its host and registrar and send an abuse report with screenshots and the fake URL. If money was lost, contacting law enforcement is the right step. Reporting quickly matters, because fake shops are often active for only a few days before moving to a new name.