Not long ago the web's trust system had a weak spot: any of hundreds of certificate authorities could issue a certificate for any domain, and nobody would find out right away. If an authority was compromised or made a mistake, an attacker could obtain a fake certificate for a popular site and deceive users. Such incidents really happened. Certificate Transparency (CT) was created to fix this, and today every public SSL certificate passes through it.
The idea of a public log
Every certificate an authority issues must be recorded in a log that anyone can read. These CT logs are run by various companies and organisations and are append-only: entries can be added but not removed or altered. A cryptographic structure called a Merkle tree guarantees this, because any secret change to an old entry breaks the log's mathematical fingerprint and observers notice. CT does not technically block a rogue certificate, but it makes hiding one impossible, which pushes authorities to be far more careful.
SCTs: proof of logging
When an authority submits a certificate to a log, the log returns an SCT (Signed Certificate Timestamp), a signed promise to include the certificate within a set time. SCTs are usually embedded in the certificate itself, so site owners need no extra configuration. Chrome and Safari reject certificates that lack enough SCTs from trusted logs; the exact rules live in each browser's CT policy and change over time. You can inspect the SCTs in your certificate:
echo | openssl s_client -connect example.uz:443 -servername example.uz 2>/dev/null \
| openssl x509 -noout -text | grep -A 12 "CT Precertificate SCTs"
Searching the logs
Because the logs are public, free search services exist. The best known is crt.sh, which aggregates several logs. Search for a domain and you see every certificate issued for it and its subdomains, with issuer and validity dates. From the command line (requires jq):
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=example.uz&output=json" \
| jq -r '.[] | "\(.not_before) \(.issuer_name) \(.name_value)"' \
| sort -u | tail -20
crt.sh is a free public service, so it is sometimes slow or briefly unavailable.
Example: an online shop watches its domain
Imagine a Tashkent home appliance shop running on misol.uz, checkout page included. Once a month the owner checks the domain on crt.sh. One day a certificate from an unfamiliar authority appears. It turns out a developer obtained it for a test server through another service. This time it was harmless, but had a stranger obtained it, the owner would have been among the first to know. The response would be to ask the issuing authority to revoke it, change the passwords for the domain management account and check DNS records for unexpected changes; for domains managed in the sayt.uz cabinet, DNS and NS settings are all in one place.
Pair CT with a CAA record
CT detects a mistake after the fact, while a CAA DNS record restricts it in advance by listing which authorities may issue for your domain. Authorities must check it before issuing:
misol.uz. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
misol.uz. 3600 IN CAA 0 iodef "mailto:admin@misol.uz"
The second line names an address for violation reports, though not every authority sends them.
Automating CT monitoring
Manual monthly checks may be enough for a small site, but for several important domains automation is easier. Some security companies offer free services that watch CT logs and email you when a new certificate appears, or you can run the crt.sh query daily from cron and compare results. Remember that only publicly trusted certificates are logged, and that every name in a logged certificate is visible to everyone, so think about which internal hostnames you put into certificates.
For most owners CT works invisibly, yet it gives you real oversight of your own domain.