Many people assume SSL certificates are only for public websites. Yet internal office systems such as a CRM, inventory tool, accounting web interface or CCTV panel also send passwords and sensitive data across the network. Over plain HTTP, any device on the same network, including a guest laptop on the office Wi-Fi, can intercept that traffic. HTTPS on internal sites is now a baseline, not a luxury.
Why internal names can't get a public certificate
Offices often use addresses like crm.local, server01 or simply 192.168.1.10. Public certificate authorities will not issue certificates for these names: nobody owns them, and the same name exists in thousands of networks worldwide. Browser-trusted CAs follow shared industry rules and only issue for real domain names whose control can be proven. That leaves two main options: use a subdomain of a domain you own, or run your own internal CA.
Option one: a real subdomain with DNS-01 validation
If your company owns example.uz, you can name the internal system crm.ofis.example.uz. The office DNS server points it at a local IP, so the site is invisible from the internet. HTTP validation won't work because the CA cannot reach your internal server, so you use DNS-01: you publish a TXT record in the domain's zone and the CA checks it to confirm control.
certbot certonly --manual --preferred-challenges dns \
-d crm.ofis.example.uz
# Add the value certbot prints as a TXT record:
# _acme-challenge.crm.ofis.example.uz TXT "value-from-certbot"
dig TXT _acme-challenge.crm.ofis.example.uz +short
A certificate obtained with --manual will not renew itself after 90 days, so for ongoing use pick a plugin that talks to your DNS provider's API, or a tool such as acme.sh. If your DNS records live in the sayt.uz cabinet, you can add the TXT record there; ask support about automation options.
One caveat
Every certificate from a public CA is logged in public Certificate Transparency logs, so the name crm.ofis.example.uz becomes visible to anyone. The site stays unreachable, but the hostname itself may reveal what you run internally. Avoid overly descriptive names, or cover several internal systems with one wildcard certificate for *.ofis.example.uz.
Option two: your own internal CA
Some organisations don't want internal names in public logs at all, or their systems are reachable only by IP. They create an internal CA: generate a root certificate and key, then sign a certificate for each internal site. The crucial step is installing the root as trusted on every office computer and phone; otherwise browsers still warn.
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -sha256 -days 3650 -nodes \
-keyout ofis-root.key -out ofis-root.crt -subj "/CN=Office Internal CA"
openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout crm.key -out crm.csr \
-subj "/CN=crm.local"
printf "subjectAltName=DNS:crm.local,IP:192.168.1.10" > san.ext
openssl x509 -req -in crm.csr -CA ofis-root.crt -CAkey ofis-root.key \
-CAcreateserial -out crm.crt -days 397 -sha256 -extfile san.ext
Keep the root key offline or encrypted. Anyone who obtains it can mint certificates for any site that your office machines will trust. With many sites and devices, an internal ACME server such as step-ca automates issuance and renewal.
Example: a clinic in Tashkent
A private clinic in Tashkent has 25 computers at reception, the lab and doctors' rooms using a patient database at http://192.168.0.5. Diagnoses and phone numbers travel unencrypted, and the guest Wi-Fi shares the same network. Because the clinic owns misol.uz, the administrator pointed baza.ichki.misol.uz at the server in internal DNS, issued a certificate via DNS-01, and moved guest Wi-Fi to a separate network. Staff now see the padlock, no device needed extra setup, and the certificate renews automatically through the DNS API. Had the clinic wanted names kept out of public logs, it could have deployed an internal CA and pushed the root to all 25 PCs via Group Policy.
Which option to choose
| Criterion | Subdomain + DNS-01 | Internal CA |
|---|---|---|
| Device setup | None | Install root on each |
| IPs and .local names | Not supported | Supported |
| Name in public logs | Visible | Hidden |
| Auto-renewal | Needs DNS API | Needs internal ACME |
For a small office the first option is usually simpler, since even a guest's phone trusts the certificate. Larger organisations with strict policies gain full control from an internal CA. Either way, never train staff to click through self-signed certificate warnings: that habit will kick in during a real attack too.